Dear readers
Here is the digest for November 17th, 2004

HAMAS & Elections
Analysis-Ghassan Andoni-IMEMC, November 17, 2004

Arafat's quick and still controversial death has shaken the delicate
balance between the Palestinian Authority and active resistance
groups. Arafat's presence enforced certain redlines that both sides
did not cross.

Yet, even in his presence and through the four years of an intensive
crisis, the internal Palestinian political map changed dramatically,
and his departure made it possible for both sides to attempt to cross
redlines.

For the growing in popularity and influence Islamic Resistance
Movement (HAMAS), Arafat's departure is worrying, but also an
opportunity. In his presence, it was unthinkable to take practical
steps to challenge Fatah's leadership to both the PA and the PLO; yet,
Arafat's mere presence presented a guarantee that PA security will not
turn against the Islamic Movement in general, and its military wing in
particular.

Carefully measuring their steps, the leaders of the Islamic Movement
are likely to let go their long standing ideological stand and revert
to a more pragmatic approach. Hamas, and for long, stood firmly
against taking part in any political structure or procedure produced
by the PLO-Israel Oslo agreement.

Growing into becoming the backbone of Palestinian opposition groups,
Hamas is unlikely to join the PLO, the main body holding
responsibility for negotiations and signed agreements, or the
executive bodies of the Palestinian Authority, an authority tied with
regional and international agreements and obligations.

Yet, Hamas' leaders had officially demanded from the newly emerging PA
leadership to run legislative and local authority elections parallel
to the planned January 9, presidential elections, indicating
willingness, for the first time since the movement was established, to
actively take part in both.

Hamas hoped that Sharon's unilateral engagement will provide the
movement with the chance to gain a considerable share in
administrating the "liberated Strip", yet, with the apparent movement
towards a coordinated with the PA pullout, Hamas is tuned towards
stepping actively into Palestinian public affairs as the main
opposition group.

The leaders of the Islamic movement are hoping that Palestinians,
through ballot boxes, will provide Hamas and other opposition groups
with a parliamentarian majority that can set an end to "Fatah's
monopoly" over Palestinian public life.

In pressing for legislative elections, Hamas can partially, but not
fully, avoid the need to change its political ideological stand, and
at the same time enter Palestinian political life from wide enough
gates without threatening the chances of the emerging PLO strong
leader Mahmoud Abbas to win Presidential elections.

Due to complicated regional and International implications, Hamas
knows by heart that challenging Abbas in presidential elections is
likely to hinder the ability of Palestinians to run any kind of
elections.

Based on this, it is safe to state that Hamas is not tuned to obstacle
or obstruct the ongoing process of leadership building, and is heading
towards a more positive stand than most commentators anticipated.

In their talks with Abbas in Gaza, Hamas' leaders did not rule out a
cease-fire, but asked the new PLO head to only present his proposal
after receiving guarantees that Israel will also abide to a cease-
fire.

Hamas's call for a unified leadership reflects the Islamic Movement
desire to create a parallel body to the PLO, therefore downgrading the
PLO rule in Palestinian political life.
So far, Hamas looks at a field leadership that is similar to the
already existing National and Islamic committees at the different
regions of the Palestinian territories as an acceptable body that
allows a more realistic representation of the different Palestinian
factions than the Fatah dominated PLO.



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