Dear readers
Here is the digest for November 27th, 2004
1- Opposition Groups & Elections
2- No Comments
1- Opposition Groups & Elections
Analysis-Ghassan Andoni-IMEMC, November 27, 2004
Contrary to 1996 elections, most Palestinian opposition groups decided
to take an active role in the planned for January 9, PA presidential
elections.
Even when it seems that the Islamic movement will not nominate a
candidate for PA chairman, the recently released Shaeikh Hassan
Yousif, the most prominent Hamas West Bank leaders, affirmed that the
Islamic movement members will head to ballot boxes.
Palestinian Opposition groups learned well the lessons of 1996
elections. They realized that their decision to boycott elections for
political and ideological reasons distanced them from the community
socio-political life, and paved the way for establishing a one party
role system.
Most of the PLO opposition groups paid a heavy price for not taking
part in Palestinian public life, they lost much of the support they
enjoyed among the public, and were forced to accommodate themselves on
the sides of a public system fully dominated by Fatah.
Launching active resistance and forcing a military presence inside the
Palestinian occupied territories was the only platform available for
them to assert their public influence.
The widespread national and Islamic coordination committees presented
a parallel forum to the PA, where opposition groups collectively
engaged in the community public affairs, especially as the PA was
cracking under the occupation heavy blows.
Yet, the rule the committees played was localized, and produced very
limited, if any, influence on Palestinian socio-political life.
Most of such committees were dominated by Fatah, which maintained
presence in popular committees through the "Tanzim".
An exception is the Islamic movement, which gained most of its popular
support by becoming the leading resistance group, and through being
seen by many as the alternative to the "corrupted" Palestinian
Authority.
Evidently, the most serious challenge the new Palestinian official
leadership faced, came from inside Fatah; the possible nomination of
jaild Fatah leader Marwan Barghouthi as an independent candidate.
Being the most popular figure among Fatah activists, and enjoying wide
respect among opposition groups, Barghouthi presented a major
challenge to the unanimously selected PLO new leader Mahmoud Abbas.
His decision not to run came as a relief to Abbas in particular and
most of Fatah's old guards, who dominate the movement's decision
making platforms.
The coalition of the five leftist PLO groups failed so far to agree on
one nominee to represent them in the upcoming January 9, elections.
Yet, the Palestinian national initiative, a newly established lefts
group, decision to nominate Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi, a Peoples Party
rival, forced the peoples party to nominate its General Secretary
Bassam Salhi, indicating that leftist groups are approaching elections
more fragmented than ever.
In conclusion, leftist groups don't represent a serious threat to
Abbas's nomination.
The Islamic movement, which enjoys a considerable public support, is
still wavering about what role to play in the coming elections.
If the movement decide to strongly back any of the independent
candidates, it would present a considerable challenge to Abbas.
But, the movement is likely to think twice before standing openly
against the emerging PLO-PA leadership.
On one hand, Hamas still believes that being in good terms with the
official authority is an advantage that should not be let go easily.
They still look at the example of Hezbollah and the Lebanese
government as the most convenient style of relation between a
resistance group and an official authority.
Sheikh Hassan Yousif said on Thursday that Hamas will do its utmost to
cooperate with the PLO new head Mahmoud Abbas.
Crossing the red borders by openly challenging the PA-PLO leadership
requires more careful calculations and might increase the potential
for a future collision.
Also, Hamas knows that even if one of the independent candidates is
elected as a president, he/she stands no chance to assume authority in
a Fatah dominated PA legislative, security, and civil institutions.
As Barghouthi comes from inside the Fatah establishment, he presented
an attractive option for a candidate that Hamas could support. Yet,
his decision to step out is likely to push Hamas a distance further
from actively participating in presidential elections.
On the other hand, an overwhelming victory for Abbas is seen as
worrying by Hamas's leadership. Therefore the Islamic movement could
opt towards providing limited support to one of the independent
candidates. Opposition Groups & Elections
Analysis-Ghassan Andoni-IMEMC, November 27, 2004
Contrary to 1996 elections, most Palestinian opposition groups decided
to take an active role in the planned for January 9, PA presidential
elections.
Even when it seems that the Islamic movement will not nominate a
candidate for PA chairman, the recently released Shaeikh Hassan
Yousif, the most prominent Hamas West Bank leaders, affirmed that the
Islamic movement members will head to ballot boxes.
Palestinian Opposition groups learned well the lessons of 1996
elections. They realized that their decision to boycott elections for
political and ideological reasons distanced them from the community
socio-political life, and paved the way for establishing a one party
role system.
Most of the PLO opposition groups paid a heavy price for not taking
part in Palestinian public life, they lost much of the support they
enjoyed among the public, and were forced to accommodate themselves on
the sides of a public system fully dominated by Fatah.
Launching active resistance and forcing a military presence inside the
Palestinian occupied territories was the only platform available for
them to assert their public influence.
The widespread national and Islamic coordination committees presented
a parallel forum to the PA, where opposition groups collectively
engaged in the community public affairs, especially as the PA was
cracking under the occupation heavy blows.
Yet, the rule the committees played was localized, and produced very
limited, if any, influence on Palestinian socio-political life.
Most of such committees were dominated by Fatah, which maintained
presence in popular committees through the "Tanzim".
An exception is the Islamic movement, which gained most of its popular
support by becoming the leading resistance group, and through being
seen by many as the alternative to the "corrupted" Palestinian
Authority.
Evidently, the most serious challenge the new Palestinian official
leadership faced, came from inside Fatah; the possible nomination of
jaild Fatah leader Marwan Barghouthi as an independent candidate.
Being the most popular figure among Fatah activists, and enjoying wide
respect among opposition groups, Barghouthi presented a major
challenge to the unanimously selected PLO new leader Mahmoud Abbas.
His decision not to run came as a relief to Abbas in particular and
most of Fatah's old guards, who dominate the movement's decision
making platforms.
The coalition of the five leftist PLO groups failed so far to agree on
one nominee to represent them in the upcoming January 9, elections.
Yet, the Palestinian national initiative, a newly established lefts
group, decision to nominate Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi, a Peoples Party
rival, forced the peoples party to nominate its General Secretary
Bassam Salhi, indicating that leftist groups are approaching elections
more fragmented than ever.
In conclusion, leftist groups don't represent a serious threat to
Abbas's nomination.
The Islamic movement, which enjoys a considerable public support, is
still wavering about what role to play in the coming elections.
If the movement decide to strongly back any of the independent
candidates, it would present a considerable challenge to Abbas.
But, the movement is likely to think twice before standing openly
against the emerging PLO-PA leadership.
On one hand, Hamas still believes that being in good terms with the
official authority is an advantage that should not be let go easily.
They still look at the example of Hezbollah and the Lebanese
government as the most convenient style of relation between a
resistance group and an official authority.
Sheikh Hassan Yousif said on Thursday that Hamas will do its utmost to
cooperate with the PLO new head Mahmoud Abbas.
Crossing the red borders by openly challenging the PA-PLO leadership
requires more careful calculations and might increase the potential
for a future collision.
Also, Hamas knows that even if one of the independent candidates is
elected as a president, he/she stands no chance to assume authority in
a Fatah dominated PA legislative, security, and civil institutions.
As Barghouthi comes from inside the Fatah establishment, he presented
an attractive option for a candidate that Hamas could support. Yet,
his decision to step out is likely to push Hamas a distance further
from actively participating in presidential elections.
On the other hand, an overwhelming victory for Abbas is seen as
worrying by Hamas's leadership. Therefore the Islamic movement could
opt towards providing limited support to one of the independent
candidates.
2- No Comments
Ghassan Andoni-IMEMC, November 27, 2004
The Wireless exchange between soldiers prior to the confirm Killing of
Iman Alhamas 13, at the Girit outpost near Rafah. Recorded and
broadcasted by Israeli TV channel 2.
-we identified an Arab female 100m from the gate of the outpost
=what did you see?
-Root, we saw one on "two legs" 100m away from the post.
=Sfard, can you see her?
--positive, a little girl running, the target is moving to the east.
=define the position.
--north of Morshah
=position not correct
--she is now behind the digger, she is dying of fear, shots passed few
centimeters from her.
=they are shooting at her; our soldiers are 70m away from her.
--I believe one of our posts "brought her down"
=what? Did you see that she was hit? did she fell down?
--yes, and she is not moving.
=received.
--I and Jefro are moving forward to confirm the killing, cover for us.
The situation is as follows: we conducted orders and fired at her, she
wears jeans, a T-shirt, and a head cover. Killing confirmed.
=received
=any thing that moves in this domain, even if a three years old should
be killed.
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